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ABSTRACT
Defined benefit pension plans have become considerably less common since the early 1980s, while
defined contribution plans have spread. Previous research showed that defined benefit plans, with
sharp incentives encouraging retirement after a certain point, contributed to the striking postwar
decline in American retirement ages. In this paper we find that the absence of age-related incentives
in defined contribution plans leads workers to retire almost two years later on average, compared
to workers with defined benefit plans. Thus, the evolution of pension structure can help explain
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  The typical employer-provided pension has changed dramatically in the last twenty years.  
The percentage of pensioned full-time employees with a 401(k) or other defined contribution 
(DC) plan rose from 40% in 1983 to 79% in 1998.  The percentage covered by a defined benefit 
(DB) plan declined similarly, from 87% in 1983 to 44% in 1998.
1  
Pension wealth in traditional DB plans is a complicated function of earnings, tenure, and 
age.  DB pension wealth typically accumulates slowly early in a job, accelerates or jumps after 
many years of tenure, and then ultimately slows down or declines if one stays in the job long 
enough.  Therefore, DB pensions encourage workers to stay early on in order to gain access to 
large future pension accruals, and later to leave, after 25-30 years of tenure.
2  Earlier studies 
showed that DB pension plans influenced retirement behavior by as much or more than Social 
Security, and that the postwar spread of DB plans contributed to the striking decline in American 
retirement ages.
3  However, retirement ages leveled off in the early 1980s and employment at 
older ages has risen since then.
4  We argue that the shift in pension structure played a role in 
reversing the decades’ long decline.  DC pensions accumulate a lump sum which depends strictly 
on contributions and returns accumulated in a portable account, so the timing of pension wealth 
accruals is not tied to the timing of retirement as in DB pensions.   
Our goal in this study is to analyze how the decline in DB pension coverage has 
influenced retirement.  Our approach is essentially quasi-experimental, comparing retirement 
responses to financial incentives in DB versus DC plans.   In addition, we offer some further 
extensions to the literature on private pensions.  We show that the measures of pension accrual 
that are crucial for understanding DB pension incentives do not meaningfully describe DC plans.  
                                                 
1  EBRI (1996) and authors’ computations from the Survey of Consumer Finances.   
2  These age-related incentives were documented by Burkhauser (1979) and Kotlikoff and Wise (1985, 1987, 1989).   
3  Costa (1998) reported that labor force participation rates fell from 58% to less than 20% between 1930 and 1990 
among men aged 65+ and from 82% to 67% between 1940 and 1990 among men aged 55-64.    
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We also employ new data from the nationally representative, longitudinal Health and Retirement 
Study.  The HRS began in 1992, more recently than data used in earlier studies of DB pensions, 
and it offers descriptions of pension plans from employers.
5   
We hypothesize that retirement hazards will smooth out for workers with DC plans, 
compared to workers with DB plans.  In theory, that might reduce the average retirement age, if 
DB plans generally constrain workers to retire later than they would otherwise; or it might raise 
it, if DB plans constrain workers to retire earlier.  Our estimates show that the differences in 
pension wealth accrual significantly affect retirement.  Simulations based on the estimates 
demonstrate that workers with DB plans retire almost two years earlier, on average, compared to 
workers with DC plans and holding other characteristics constant.  Accounting for DC 
contributions that are voluntary and possibly endogenous does not affect the estimation results, 
nor does allowing retirement behavior to differ by pension type, which controls flexibly for other 
differences between DB and DC pensions.   
The simulation results imply that the shift in pension structure will raise the median 
retirement age by about 10 months when comparing full-time employees with a pension in the 
cohort aged 53-57 in 1983 with the cohort aged 53-57 in 2015.  Under different assumptions 
about those without a pension, this corresponds to a 9-12 month increase in the median 
retirement age of all full-time employees in those cohorts.  This response stands in sharp contrast 
to the trend towards earlier retirement that slowed down in the early 1980s, and it can help 
explain recent increases in employment among people in their 60s. 
                                                                                                                                                             
4  These recent trends have been documented by Quinn (2000) and Genser (2001).   
5  Coile and Gruber (2000) used the same HRS data to analyze the impact of Social Security on retirement.  In some 
of their specifications they included private pensions, but they summed together pension and Social Security 
incentives, and they measured financial incentives in DB and DC plans in the same way. 
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While our work builds on previous research that treats pension type as exogenous, we 
recognize that workers may sort into firms endogenously, based on pension characteristics or on 
other characteristics correlated with pensions.  We argue that the shift in pension structure does 
not appear to be related to retirement preferences.    Moreover, we find little evidence of sorting 
into pension type on observable worker and job characteristics. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  In Section I, we outline how differences 
between DB and DC pensions influence retirement and why pension structure may have changed.  
In Section II we describe the data and show raw statistics on pensions and retirement.  We present 
the estimation and simulation results in Section III and summarize our findings in Section IV. 
 
I.  PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT 
In this section, we show how pension structure may influence retirement.  Then, we 
discuss why pension structure may have changed and argue that these changes occurred for 
reasons that were unrelated to retirement preferences.   
 
A.  The impact of pensions on retirement 
The retirement decision.  Each period a worker decides whether to stay in a job or leave 
(retire).
6  He or she weighs the utility of retiring now or of staying and deciding next period 
whether to retire.  The value of this decision Vt can be written as Vt = V(Rt), where Rt equals one 
if the decision is to retire and zero if the decision is to stay in the job.  
Suppose that the value of staying in the job this period is 
  V(0) = u
0(Wt) + β  E(Vt+1) (1) 
                                                 
6  This framework may apply to quits at any age, if leaving a job is irreversible.  Similarly, older workers may 
choose to take another job rather than retiring completely.  These extensions do not alter the qualitative impact of 
pensions.  
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the sum of utility from the wage Wt received this period and the discounted expected value of 
facing the retirement decision next period.
7  Suppose that the value of retiring is 
  V(1) = u
1(Pt )  
which depends on pension wealth Pt and possibly other factors, such as utility from  leisure or 
another job.  The decision depends on how current and expected future compensation in the job 
compare to the value of retirement. 
Pensions.  A pension is a form of compensation deferred until a worker leaves his or her job and 
often conditioned on having reached a certain age and/or tenure before leaving.  A key factor is 
the value of the pension as the retirement date changes: 
•   Delaying retirement may substantially raise long-term benefits, so pension wealth accrual is 
large at some future date, though small today.  That raises Vt+1, Vt+2, … in (1),  encouraging later 
retirement.  This pattern arises in DB plans at younger ages.   
•   Delaying retirement may have little or no effect on future pension benefits.  Then, the 
foregone income makes pension wealth accrual small or negative, encouraging immediate 
retirement.  This pattern generally arises in DB plans after eligibility for early or full benefits.   
•   Future pension benefits may increase at a constant rate when retirement is delayed.  This 
pattern occurs in DC plans, in which case the incentive to retire depends on factors like the 
employer contribution rate.
8 
DB pension wealth accrual. A person who retires at age t has DB pension wealth equal to  
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7  β  reflects the rate of time preference and mortality risk, which is assumed fixed for simplicity. 
8 These distinctions between the path of DB and DC pension accruals were also noted by Quinn et al (1998).  
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or the expected discounted value of pension benefit flows p(q, t) received each period after the 
pension commences at age q ≥  t.
9  A typical formula for p(q, t) involves a benefit that is 
proportional to the worker’s final or average salary, with the proportion increasing in tenure.  
Benefits are discounted to time t by the age-conditional probability of survival δ  and the interest 
rate r.   
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 - Pt , indicates the gain in pension 
wealth if one works an additional year and then retires.  Figure 1 shows pension wealth accrual 
in an actual DB plan as the retirement age t increases.
10   
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Two or three key dates can cause sharp changes in
DB  
 t P .  Pension wealth is zero until the 
vesting date, when a worker becomes eligible to receive a future pension.   The maximum 
                                                 
9  A person who quits may not be eligible to receive benefits immediately, but it is almost always optimal to begin 
receiving benefits as soon as one is eligible.    
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vesting date is now 5-7 years but was 10 years in the plan shown in Figure 1.  Pension wealth 
then accrues gradually as the future benefit rises with earnings growth, tenure, and the approach 
of retirement.  Pension wealth accrual generally spikes again if the plan offers an early retirement 
date (ERD), when a worker can leave the job and first receive a reduced benefit, or at the normal 
retirement date (NRD), when a worker qualifies for the full benefit.  The spike in Figure 1 results 
from a discrete jump in the pension benefit at the ERD.  Accruals are negative following the 
NRD because current benefits are foregone and future benefits are often flat.  In Figure 1 the 
penalty for receiving early benefits is mild, so accruals turn negative after the ERD.
11   
It is clear that a single year’s pension accrual does not capture the full value of 
postponing retirement.  Stock and Wise (1990a) developed an “option value” approach that 
reflects the increment to utility from postponing retirement and gaining access to distant 
accruals.  Estimation of their model requires numerous functional form and distributional 
assumptions, however.  Coile and Gruber (2000), in their analysis of Social Security incentives, 
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where pension wealth reaches its discounted maximum in future year m.  They argued that peak 
value isolates the key incentives influencing retirement while imposing fewer assumptions.
12  
Although peak value does not fully capture the effect of the number of years until the peak, we 
find that the results are not sensitive to normalizing by years to peak.  
                                                                                                                                                             
10  The pension accruals in Figure 1 were computed from sample HRS plans that were slightly modified to protect 
anonymity.  Following the literature, our calculations assume a 3% real discount rate, average mortality probabilities 
by age and gender, and a terminal age of 120.   
11  The maximum vesting period was reduced in 1989; most workers in our sample had already passed the vesting 
date before it was reduced, and the shorter vesting date is incorporated in plans of workers who had not.  1986 
legislation that eliminated the use of age-related limits on maximum pension benefits is also reflected in the plans in 
our sample; tenure-related limits are still permitted (see, for example, Mitchell 1999, Table 15) and generate 
negative accruals like those shown in Figure 1.  
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DC pension wealth accrual.  DC plans function very differently.  DC pension wealth is the market 
value of current assets.
13  The gain to DC pension wealth each period is the return on the initial 
balance plus this year’s contributions from the employee and employer.  While contributions to a 
401(k) are voluntary, they are mandatory in other DC plans.
14 
An additional year of work has no effect on pension wealth if contributions are zero and 
raises pension wealth if contributions are positive.  Therefore, DC pension wealth never reaches a 
peak, and the peak-value measure is not meaningful.  This is apparent in the pension accruals 
shown in Figure 1 from a typical DC plan.  Only a portion of DC pension accruals constitute an 
incentive to delay retirement.  Employer contributions will cease at retirement, and access to a 
tax-deferred savings vehicle will diminish or cease.  In contrast, existing assets will generate 
returns regardless of retirement.   
There are, nonetheless, two potentially important dates in DC pension wealth accrual.  
First, some DC plans have vesting dates of up to five years, though a majority vest within 0-2 
years (Mitchell 1999).  Second, 401(k) funds can be withdrawn without a penalty beginning at 
age 59½; we will test for an age-59½ effect on retirement. 
Another important point is that voluntary contributions may replace other personal saving 
and thus depend on retirement intentions – an important point because voluntary contributions 
generate some, though not all, of the cross-sectional variation in pension accrual.  Therefore, we 
try omitting a measure of voluntary contributions from DC pension wealth when we estimate the 
impact of pensions on retirement.  
                                                                                                                                                             
12  Samwick (2000) demonstrated that controlling separately for earnings, as we do, captures the key difference 
between the option value and peak value measures. 
13  To be precise, DC pension wealth should also include the present value of future tax relief.  We will follow the 
literature in omitting this component, since DB pension wealth is also tax-deferred. 
14  Other types of DC plans are money purchase plans, profit sharing plans, target benefit plans, simplified employee 
pensions, and employee stock ownership plans.  
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Lastly, as we noted earlier, most existing research on 401(k) plans examined their impact 
on personal saving.
15  This debate is not relevant for our paper.  Differences in pension structure 
can influence retirement whether or not they alter savings rates. 
 
B.  Summary of key differences 
16 
DC pension wealth accrues smoothly.  We hypothesize that retirement hazards will smooth out 
for workers with DC plans, compared to workers with DB plans who experience swings in 
pension accruals.  This could lead to earlier retirement under DC plans, if DB plans have 
generally constrained workers to retire later than they would otherwise in order to gain access to 
the peaks in pension wealth accrual, or it might lead to later retirement, if DB plans have 
constrained workers to retire early, when accruals drop off or turn negative.  We will be able to 
distinguish which through simulations based on our estimation results.   
DC pension wealth includes voluntary contributions.  Since these may be determined 
endogenously with retirement plans, we examine whether voluntary contributions affect 
estimates of the influence of DC pensions. 
DC plans are typically not annuitized.  By insuring against lifespan uncertainty, a DB plan with 
actuarially equivalent present value is worth more than a DC plan to a risk-averse individual 
lacking a  bequest motive.
17  Workers with DC plans may therefore save more or retire later.  
While we lack sufficient information on annuitization options in DC plans in order to identify the 
direct impact on retirement, we allow for distinct effects on retirement of different types of pension 
wealth in order to capture differences like these. 
                                                 
15  See, for example, Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996) and Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996). 
16  Friedberg and Owyang (2002a) describe these and other differences between DB and DC pensions in more detail. 
17  Less than 20% of DC plans allow annuitization after retirement (Brown, Mitchell, Poterba, and Warshawsky 
1999).  
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DB and DC pensions have different risk characteristics.  The DB rate of return depends on 
earnings growth before retirement and on inflation after retirement.  The DC rate of return 
depends on portfolio choices and yields, and differences between expected and realized rates of 
return may alter retirement plans.
18  Again, we allow different effects of different types of 
pension wealth to capture distinctions like these.  We also try a specification that includes a 
control for people who invested their DC plans mostly in stocks, although this is potentially 
endogenous with retirement plans. 
DC pensions have shorter vesting periods.  Taking a new job may have become more attractive 
to older workers, since new jobs are now more likely to offer a DC instead of a DB pension, and 
quick vesting in DC plans raises effective compensation for people who expect to retire fully a 
few years later.  Thus, we distinguish in the empirical analysis between people who leave their 
pensioned job for another job and those who retire fully. 
 
C.  What determines the structure of pensions? 
In Lazear’s theory of deferred compensation, DB pensions solve a contracting problem 
between workers and firms (see, for example, Lazear 1986).  Firms cannot perfectly monitor 
workers but want to deter shirking.   Deferred pension accruals, as well as a rising wage profile, 
induce workers to devote optimal effort so that they do not lose their jobs.  A similar motive for 
deferred compensation arises if workers require firm-specific training or hiring is costly for other 
reasons.  At some point, however, rising wages exceed marginal productivity of older workers.  
DB pension provisions help encourage retirement at an appropriate age.   
While various elements of these theories have found support in explaining the use of DB 
pensions, they offer little insight about the use of DC pensions or about their increasing 
                                                 
18  For example, workers who invested their DC assets in equities may have earned unexpectedly high returns in the  
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prevalence.  Most explanations for the shift in pension structure focus on regulatory changes, 
which have had several effects.  A series of laws enacted since 1974 tightened DB funding 
standards, enhanced workers’ claims to DB pension wealth after leaving a job, restricted the use 
of pensions in compensating highly-paid employees, and extended tax breaks for DC 
contributions.  The new rules raised the cost of administering pensions, but early evidence yields 
mixed conclusions about its impact.  Ippolito (1995) reported estimates from the Hay-Huggins 
Company (1990) indicating that only very small DB plans grew relatively more expensive to 
administer; for larger firms, average costs of DB and 401(k) plans rose at similar rates.  Kruse 
(1995) concluded that rising administrative costs might explain some but not all of the decline in 
DB pensions during 1980-86.  Clark and McDermed (1990) argued, further, that some of the 
restrictions limited the usefulness of DB pensions in providing optimal long-term incentives.  
Nevertheless, it is apparent from Figure 1 that DB plans can still be designed to deliver pension 
wealth in a highly nonlinear fashion.     
Friedberg and Owyang (2002b) offered another explanation for the decline in DB 
coverage.  Building on Lazear’s theory, they examined reasons why the value of long-term jobs 
might have declined.  Their explanation emphasizes the nature of long-term jobs held by prime-
age workers, rather than retirement incentives of older workers.  That focus is consistent with the 
more rapid change in pension structure among younger workers; with an overall decline in 
average job tenure; and with evidence of structural change in the economy involving workers of 
all ages – for example, the rate of decline in the use of DB plans has varied across industries, and 
workers (who typically move when they are young) have shifted from jobs typically covered by 
DB plans to jobs typically covered by DC plans.
19   
                                                                                                                                                             
late 1990s and then chosen to retire early.  Coronado and Perozek (2001) found evidence of this in the HRS. 
19 Clark and McDermed (1990), Gustman and Steinmeier (1992), Ippolito (1995), Kruse (1995), Papke (1999).  
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In sum, both the regulatory and contracting explanations for the shift in pension structure 
appear to have little to do with retirement incentives.  If anything, the move away from DB plans 
may have increased firms' use of temporary early retirement inducements.
20 
We recognize nonetheless that pensions and retirement may be endogenously determined.  
A firm’s choice of pension structure may be influenced by factors correlated with the average 
age and retirement preferences of workers.  However, we do not believe it is feasible to estimate 
the determinants of pension design.  Filer and Honig (1998), for example, failed to find 
convincing exclusion restrictions when allowing for endogenous DB pension design.
21  
Nevertheless, we address some concerns about endogenous sorting.  We control for observable 
worker and job characteristics (e.g., firm size, industry, unionization, job tenure) that are 
correlated with pension type; none influence the estimated effect of pension characteristics on 
retirement.  Also, we show that older workers with different pensions types are quite similar on 
other key dimensions like earnings and wealth, along which one might expect observable 
differences if workers were sorting by retirement preferences or related characteristics. 
 
II.  DATA 
A.  The Health and Retirement Study 
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is a detailed longitudinal survey of over 7,600 
households with a member born between 1931 and 1941.  The HRS began in 1992 and surveys 
people every two years.  We use data from the first four waves.
22  The HRS reports 
unprecedented detail about household and job characteristics as people age.  For people who said 
                                                 
20  Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1990), Brown (1999). 
21  They estimated a joint model of the DB early retirement date faced by a worker, along with the worker’s actual 
retirement age.  They used macroeconomic variables (unemployment, inflation) at the hiring date to identify the 
impact of the pension retirement age on retirement.  These variables did not have a statistically significant impact on 
the pension, however, so the estimation was essentially identified from nonlinear functional form.  
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they had a pension and gave permission, the HRS contacted employers to get information about 
the pension.  The HRS also obtained Social Security earnings records for those who gave 
permission.  The HRS pension and Social Security data are available on a restricted basis, 
together with a program to compute private pension wealth at all ages.  We have written a similar 
program to compute approximate Social Security wealth.
23   
Gustman and Steinmeier (1999) studied the quality of the pension data.  In the first wave, 
65% of workers who reported a pension in their current job were matched to their pension data.
24  
Match failures arose either when someone refused permission to the HRS to contact their 
employer, or when the employer did not respond to HRS queries.  Gustman and Steinmeier 
found that some variables significantly affect the probability of a match, but that they have 
relatively little explanatory power.
25  In our judgment we lack sufficient information to impute 
missing pension data or control for selection due to match failure.   
For people who say they have a pension, we use employer data to determine whether they 
have only DB plans, only DC plans, or else both types or combined plans. We classify people as 
having a DB plan if their employer offers one, since participation is rarely voluntary.  We 
classify them as having a DC plan if their employer offers one and they participate in it.  We 
focus on participation rather than eligibility because the HRS did not contact employers of 
people who said they had no pension, so we miss some people who are eligible but did not 
                                                                                                                                                             
22  Third and fourth wave data are from the early releases. 
23  We use earnings records and current rules to compute the present value of Social Security benefits, but we do not 
compute dependent and survivor benefits. 
24  Since the match rate for earlier pensions was only 35%, we do not focus on exit from earlier jobs.  If DB pensions 
encouraged some HRS respondents to leave their main job before they were first observed 1992, sample selection 
would bias our estimates downward. 
25  In a probit estimating the likelihood of getting pension data, the pseudo R-squared was 0.1164.  The likelihood of 
a match rose with education, firm size, the value of self-reported pension assets, and working in a non-manufacturing 
firm, and fell with personal assets and earnings.    
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participate.
26  This might bias the results if, for example, people who intend to retire later do not 
contribute to their 401(k); we address some concerns about endogenous participation by 
estimating a specification that omits a measure of voluntary DC contributions. 
Employers reported the plan parameters that determine DB pension wealth.
 27  DC plan 
balances were not reported by employers, so the HRS imputed DC pension wealth from data on 
employer contributions, match rates, and compulsory and voluntary employee contributions.  
Gustman and Steinmeier recommended using these imputed values rather than self-reported plan 
balances, since respondents made frequent reporting errors.  Still, because imputed values tend to 
overstate DC pension wealth when plans allow voluntary contributions, they proposed a 
correction for this which we try as well.
28  
 
B.  Characteristics of workers and pensions 
Table 1 compares full-time employees with different types of pensions in the first wave 
in 1992.
29  We focus on those who appear in columns (1), (2), and (3); these are 1,528 people 
who have a DB and/or a DC plan in which they participate, and for whom the HRS obtained 
private and public pension data.  Among them, 62% have only DB plans, 20% have only DC 
plans, and 18% have both types or a combination plan.
30   
                                                 
26  Using different data, Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995) estimated the effect of 401(k) eligibility, rather than the 
endogenous effect of 401(k) participation, on saving.  We could do something similar if we limited the sample to 
workers with a DB plan and compared those who are additionally eligible or not for a DC plan; Webb (2002) used 
the HRS to analyze saving in this way.  However, we would not learn a great deal about retirement, since our results 
are driven by the presence or absence of a DB plan, not a DC plan. 
27  In calculating the present value of future DB pension wealth, we modified the HRS program to discount DB 
pension wealth by age-specific survival probabilities. 
28  The correction is based on regressing the ratio of self-reported to employer-reported values on the log of the 
employer-reported value and its square. 
29  We will refer to our sample of full-time employees as “workers” in the rest of the paper for ease of exposition.  
Additional sample selection criteria are mentioned in the notes to Table 1. 
30  This sample is considerably larger than in earlier pension studies.  Most researchers used data on one or a few 
firms, while Samwick (1998) used a sample of 520 employees from the 1983 SCF.  The proportions with different 
types of pension plans differ from Gustman and Steinmeier (1999) because of our focus on DC participation, rather 
than eligibility, as described earlier.  
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People with different types of pensions are quite similar, except in three dimensions; we 
control for these differences in the regressions, and they do not influence the estimated effect of 
pension incentives on retirement.  First, people with only a DC plan have average job tenure of 
14 years, compared to 18-19 for others.  This difference  is related to the recent spread of DC 
plans in new jobs.   Second, 55% of individuals with stand-alone DB plans are employed in 
professional or related services or public administration, compared with 29-33% of those with 
DC or combined plans.  Third, pension wealth differs systematically across plans.  People with 
combined plans have the highest pension wealth, with a median of $345,156 if they retire at age 
65 – higher than the sum of the median stand-alone DB plan and the median stand-alone DC 
plan.  In contrast, non-pension wealth is similar across pension type, with median financial assets 
lying in the range of $22,000-26,300.  We would not expect to find this similarity if workers 
select into pension types based on differences in retirement preferences, which should also lead 
to differences in life-cycle saving behavior. 
In other dimensions as well, people with different pension types are otherwise similar.  
Median earnings across pension type lie in the range of $30-33,000.  Education and occupation 
differ, but not by a great deal.  People who attended college comprise 52% of those with DB 
plans only, 49% with DC plans, and 57% with combination plans, while skilled workers (in 
management, professional, or technical jobs) comprise 40%, 44%, and 42%, respectively.   
Another 1,527 people reported having a pension but were not matched to their private 
pension or Social Security data.  They are slightly less educated and more likely to be in blue 
collar jobs.  1,332 people reported having no pension.  They are even less skilled and are 
substantially poorer.  We omit both groups from the analysis because we do not feel confident 
explaining who has a pension or pension data.  
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Pension characteristics are reported in Tables 2 and 3.  In these tables, and in our 
regressions, we convert the data on individuals in columns (1)-(3) of Table 1 into person-age 
cells, so each observation represents an individual at a given age.
31 
As expected, DC pension accruals are very smooth.  In Table 2 the median of pension 
accruals for men is consistently around $4-5,000, regardless of retirement age, or around $3-
4,000 when an estimate of voluntary contributions is excluded.  Women with DC plans have 
lower levels of voluntary and mandatory contributions. 
In contrast, the median DB pension accrual is highest at age 54, when the early retirement 
date is reached in many plans.  Median accruals turn rapidly negative after age 61, when many 
plans begin to pass their normal retirement date.  Women with DB plans experience positive 
pension accrual at later ages because of shorter job tenure and longer life-expectancy.  Patterns 
of accrual in the DB and DC components of combined plans resemble those of stand-alone plans.  
Lastly, it is worth emphasizing the considerable variation in the pattern of DB pension accruals 
across the sample, as indicated by the 25
th and 75
th percentile values of pension accruals shown 
in Table 3. 
  Table 4 shows the proportion of the sample from columns (1)-(3) of Table 1, at each age, 
who voluntarily leave their 1992 job and retire by 1998.  Altogether, 39% of those in our sample 
leave their job.  Workers with a DB or combined plans exit at higher rates than workers with 
only a DC plan.  At ages 55-59, 4.4% with a DB plan and 5.2% with a combined plan leave their 
job each year, on average, compared to 2.2% with a DC plan.  At ages 60-62 the statistics were 
11.8% with a DB plan, 8.7% with a combined plan, and 6.3% with a DC plan.  This key 
distinction across pension types emerges in the estimation results below. 
                                                 
31  We exclude observations of people aged 51 and 52 for ease of computation.  Few retire or reach key swings in 
pension accrual at those ages.    
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III.  ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF PENSIONS ON RETIREMENT 
  Descriptive statistics confirm that both pension wealth accruals and job exit vary with 
pension type.  This section reports estimates of the effect of pension accruals on retirement, 
controlling for pension wealth and other characteristics. 
 
A.  Estimation strategy 
We have chosen a straightforward estimation approach.  This has the advantages that we 
avoid strong assumptions about the functional form of utility, and that the source of identifying 
variation from pension incentives is clear.  We pool observations on full-time employees with 
pensions at each age between the years 1992 and 1998.
32  In most of our specifications, our left-
hand side variable is a binary indicator for whether a worker leaves a pensioned job voluntarily 
(not due to layoff or plant closure) from one age to the next and fully retires.
33  We focus later on 
exits to another job.  We estimate probits with Huber-White standard errors adjusted for person-
level clustering and use the HRS-provided person-level analysis weights.
34 
On the right-hand side, our key variable is the peak value measure of pension accrual 
(discounted peak minus current pension wealth, or zero if past the peak), introduced by Coile and 
Gruber (2000).  Although they did not, we test for a nonlinear effect of peak value, and we add 
an indicator for being at or older than the peak, since peak value is set to zero after accruals turn 
negative.  We allow separate effects of peak value in DB plans and in the DB component of 
combined plans.  Similarly, we allow separate effects of pension wealth from DB, DC, and 
combined plans, in case differences in pension structure (such as the annuitization of DB pension 
                                                 
32  Again, we will refer to full-time employees as “workers”.  Additional sample selection criteria are mentioned in 
the notes to Table 5. 
33  In contrast to our annual approach, Gustman and Steinmeier (1999) tracked employment changes and pension 
accruals by wave (i.e., over two years), which introduces some imprecision since pension accruals can varyannually.  
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wealth) imply different response to the same value of pension wealth.  Furthermore, we include 
separate dummy variables for each pension type, in case other pension characteristics are related 
to retirement.  We normalize pension variables by earnings.
35  We experiment with indicators for 
being at the early or normal DB retirement dates, in case such institutional details matter, and 
add indicators for employers matching employee contributions to DC plans, since that 
discourages retirement, and for employers offering a temporary early retirement “window plan”.   
We control for a variety of other influences on retirement, including earnings, Social 
Security peak value and wealth, on-the-job and post-retirement health insurance coverage, and 
non-pension financial assets and home ownership.  We control for employer size, industry, 
unionization, occupation, education, and tenure, which are potentially correlated with pension 
structure.  In addition, we include dummies for recent hospitalizations, gender, marital status, 
race, and age. 
 
B.  Estimation results 
  Table 5 reports marginal effects from probit estimates for several specifications.  The 
dependent variable is whether a person voluntarily leaves his or her 1992 job and retires at a 
particular age, so a positive coefficient indicates a higher probability.  The basic specification in 
5.1 follows the literature by including pension wealth and a measure of pension accrual.  The 
specification in 5.2 adds dummies for being at or past the age of peak pension wealth (when peak 
value is zero) and the pension’s normal retirement date.  Our preferred specification in 5.3 adds a 
quadratic in peak value.     
We find that both private and public pension accruals influence retirement.  In  all three 
                                                                                                                                                             
34  Coile and Gruber (2000) also estimated probits on annual retirement hazards.  They found that results from a Cox 
proportional hazards model were virtually identical.  
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specifications, peak value is significant at the 5% level for workers with DB plans and also for 
workers with combined plans.  Peak value has a larger effect in combined plans, but the 
differences across pension type are not statistically significant.  In specification 5.2, holding all 
other variables constant, having the mean DB (combined) peak value instead of a peak value of 
zero reduces the annual retirement hazard by 1.1 (3.6) percentage points for ages 55-59, or a 
20% (36%) reduction compared to the observed hazard.  The quadratic terms in peak value are 
significant in specification 5.3, and allowing for nonlinear effects actually increases the overall 
effect of peak value, both at the center of the distribution and at the first and third quartiles.  
Now, having the mean DB (combined) peak value reduces the retirement hazard by 1.7 (3.8) 
percentage points for ages 55-59, or a 29% (37%) reduction compared to the observed hazard.
36  
It should be noted that we control for tenure, age, and earnings, which are key determinants of 
peak value, so the estimated effect of peak value does not reflect their impact on retirement. 
Peak value is not economically meaningful after pension wealth peaks, so it is set to zero.  
Therefore, we added dummy variables in 5.2 and 5.3 to capture the disincentive effect of 
declining pension wealth.  Being at or older than the DB peak raises the retirement hazard by 
1.21 percentage points in 5.3, but the estimate fall a little short of statistical significance, and it is 
far from significant for combined plans. 
We also experimented with controls for being at the DB pension’s early or normal 
retirement date.  The results indicate that institutional factors sometimes affect retirement.  In 
estimates that are not shown, we found no spike in quits at the early retirement date (ERD) when 
                                                                                                                                                             
35  The “option-value” measure of pension accrual in Samwick (1998) implicitly weighs pension income by 
earnings.  We also control for earnings separately. 
36  Cubic terms in peak value are not statistically significant.  We tried normalizing peak value by years to peak, but 
the resulting coefficients are insignificant, as peak value and years to peak are highly correlated.  This shows that 
peak value captures the key pension incentives.   
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reduced pension benefits are first available.  The ERD generally occurs early, often around age 
55, when we observe few retirements.  On the other hand, being at the normal retirement date 
(NRD) significantly raises quits among DB people; it lowers quits among combined people, 
though not significantly.  The lack of significance among combined people may arise in part 
because the NRD tends to occur later in combined plans, and fewer people in our sample have 
reached the later NRD.  The NRD is 60 or younger in 35% of stand-alone DB plans, compared to 
21% of combined plans.  One reason is the greater proportion of stand-alone DB plans in 
professional services and public administration; these plans have an earlier average NRD.  
Nevertheless, controlling for industry did not affect the estimation results.  Taken together, these 
findings suggest that institutional factors and social norms involving the NRD play a role for 
people with stand-alone DB plans, which tend to have an earlier NRD. 
To continue, we allowed the effect of pension wealth to vary by pension type.  We find a 
significant and positive, though economically quite small, effect of DB wealth on DB people 
and, in 5.1, of DC wealth on combined people.  Coefficients on the other pension wealth 
variables have similar magnitudes but are not statistically significant.
37  Samwick (1998) and 
Coile and Gruber (2000) also found weak effects of pension wealth.  The results suggest that 
differences in other pension characteristics which we are not controlling for directly (the lack of 
annuitization in DC pensions, for example) do not significantly affect retirement. 
Other pension characteristics which we control for do not have a major impact.  Notably, 
the dummies for pension type are not small but they are far from significant, so the impact of 
pension type is captured primarily by the differences in accrual and wealth patterns.  Indicators 
for employers matching employee contributions to DC plans or offering early retirement  
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“window” plans are not statistically significant.  We tried other specifications that did not yield 
significant results and are not shown.  For example, we found no evidence of a spike in 
retirement for DC people at ages 59 and 60, when 401(k) withdrawals no longer suffer tax 
penalties, or of other pension-related differences in retirement by age.
38  Retirement hazards of 
people who report investing their DC plan partly or mostly in stocks were not significantly 
different; this variable was not included in our main specification because portfolio choice is 
potentially endogenous.  A measure of subjective life expectancy was not significant and did not 
alter the estimated effect of DB plans, although annuitization makes DB pensions more valuable 
to those who are risk-averse and lack a strong bequest motive. 
As with private pensions, Social Security incentives significantly affect retirement.  
Social Security peak value reduces the retirement hazard by 1-2 percentage points for people in 
their late 50s, evaluated at the sample means; the impact is similar to peak value of private 
pension plans.
39  Although we allowed the effect of Social Security accruals to vary by private 
pension type, the responses are very similar – suggesting that people with DC plans react in the 
same way when faced with DB-type incentives as people with DB plans react.  
It is important to note that industry, unionization, job tenure, and firm size do not 
significantly influence retirement, though they are related to pension type.  Leaving these 
variables out of the regression also has little effect on the pension estimates.  Briefly, other 
control variables have the same qualitative impact on retirement found in a great deal of previous 
research.  The retirement hazard rises with age, especially after 60.  Higher financial assets are 
                                                                                                                                                             
37  Adjusting DC pension wealth for the tendency to overestimate pension wealth in plans that allow voluntary 
contributions, using the method proposed by Gustman and Steinmeier (1999) and discussed earlier, leads to larger 
but still insignificant coefficients. 
38  Thus, allowing for distinct age dummies by pension type does not alter the estimated effect of peak value.  A 
spike in DB retirements at age 55 is the only significant difference by age; it is apparently related to the importance 
of the NRD in stand-alone DB plans, mentioned earlier. 
39  Coile and Gruber (2000) found responses of a similar magnitude to Social Security.   
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associated with significantly earlier retirement, so that a 10% increase in financial assets raises 
the hazard by about 0.6 percentage points.  People with zero financial assets tend to retire earlier 
too, an anomalous result found in other research using the same data.
40  Higher earnings lead to 
highly significant, though small, delays in retirement; an additional $10,000 in earnings reduces 
the hazard by about 0.25 percentage points.
41  When an employer provides health insurance for 
workers but not retirees, a worker is about a percentage point less likely to retire.  People with 
more education are less likely to retire.  Many of the other variables fall short of statistical 
significance, but the estimates should grow more precise as the sample ages and more 
individuals retire.
42   
In sum, the estimates demonstrate that differences in pension accrual patterns alter 
retirement, as we hypothesized.  Sharp spikes in DB pension accruals influence the timing of 
retirement, compared to smooth DC accruals.  We discuss some additional specifications next 
and then analyze whether the shift in pension structure led to earlier or later retirement. 
 
C.  Additional specifications 
This section reviews additional results shown in Table 6.  We build on specification 5.3 
and try using a different discount rate, excluding voluntary DC contributions, estimating the 
impact of pensions on people taking a new job, and separating the sample by gender. 
In 6.1 we experiment with a discount rate of 5%, rather than 3%, in case people behave 
impatiently.  As Samwick (2000) pointed out, observed patterns of aggregate saving and wealth 
holdings are consistent with a relatively high discount rate.  In this case, a high discount rate 
                                                 
40  Friedberg (2003).  Omitting the wealth variables from the specification, based on the argument that they are 
endogenously determined with retirement, does not alter the estimated effect of the pension variables. 
41  We tried including a measure of recent earnings growth in order to capture the shape of the earnings profile; it did 
not have a significant effect.  
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reduces the present value of future pension accruals and hence the age of peak value.  Since we 
observe low retirement hazards at younger ages, this reduces the magnitude of the peak value 
variables, and it increases those of the pension type and past-the-peak variables.  Thus, using a 
higher discount rate does not increase the explanatory power of the pension accrual variables. 
Another concern is that voluntary DC contributions are endogenously determined with 
retirement.  Since the HRS does not distinguish between voluntary and compulsory 
contributions, we tried subtracting all employee contributions from pension wealth when plan 
rules allow for voluntary contributions.  In the resulting estimates in 6.2, DB pension variables 
continue to have a similar effect, whether or not someone has voluntary contributions in a DC 
plan.  Thus, later retirement by workers with DC plans is not explained by endogenous voluntary 
contributions; we see, as before, that it is explained by the absence of DB pension accruals. 
In this sample, 73% of quits result in retirement.  In 6.3, the dependent variable is defined 
as a job change, and retirements are now excluded.  The pension variables are insignificant for 
this sample, suggesting that a fuller understanding of job changes must await an investigation of 
the new jobs taken by those who quit.
43 
Lastly, retirement patterns differ somewhat for men and women in estimates that are not 
shown.  The influence of peak value has a similar magnitude by gender, but it has greater 
statistical significance for women.  Pension wealth tends to have smaller effects for women.  
Women react more strongly to the DB normal retirement date, which accounts for its 
significance in the earlier regressions.  Building on the explanation offered earlier, these 
differences seem to arise because DB plans in some sectors (especially professional services and 
public administration) have an earlier average NRD which is more likely to have been reached, 
                                                                                                                                                             
42  Recent hospitalization does not significantly affect retirement.  Including self-reported disability instead 
significantly raises the retirement hazard, but this variable may be correlated with unobserved retirement preferences.  
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and women are more likely to work in those sectors.  Lastly, simply having a DB or combined 
plan leads women to retire earlier.  Obviously, career paths of men and women clearly differ 
along many dimensions – only some of which are captured by differences in pension wealth – 
and warrant future investigation. 
 
D.  The aggregate impact of the decline in DB plans  
Since DB pensions encourage people to work until a certain date and then to retire, the 
shift towards DC pensions may lead to either earlier or later retirement.  We use simulations, 
based on our preferred specification in 5.3, to understand the impact of pension structure on 
retirement.  We also compare our simulation results to recent trends in retirement. 
Figure 2 shows predicted labor force participation rates at each age for workers in our 
sample who have DB pensions.
44  It compares the predicted participation rate when workers have 
their own DB pensions to predictions if they instead had a typical DC plan.  Differences in the 
underlying predicted retirement hazards arise entirely because of differences in pension 
characteristics.
45 
Forecasted participation rates begin to diverge after age 55 as some DB plans reach their 
early or normal retirement dates, though retirement hazards remain low (under 5% per year) for 
both pension types until around age 60.  At that point, retirement of workers with DB plans 
accelerates, as many pass their peak pension value.  The difference in retirement hazards by 
pension type exceeds 5 percentage points at ages 62 and up, resulting in a substantial difference 
                                                                                                                                                             
43  The HRS has not collected pension data from new employers. 
44  Recall that these are predicted participation rates for people who are in pensioned full-time jobs at ages 51-61 and 
will either stay in their pensioned jobs or retire fully.   
45  To characterize the typical DC plan, we use median pension wealth at age 53, augmented with the median of pension 
wealth accrual at each subsequent age.  We chose to allow other pension characteristics to differ as well, on the 
assumption that a change in pension type typically involves a change in pension wealth, etc.; however, pension wealth 
has a very small effect on the retirement hazards.  Other right-hand side variables are assigned their mean values.  
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in cumulative labor force participation.  The median retirement age is 62 years and 6 months for 
workers with DB plans, versus 64 years and 3 months if instead they have DC plans, a difference 
of 21 months.  We tried a similar exercise for workers with combined DB and DC plans.  
Predicted retirement hazards for workers with combined plans yield a median retirement age of 
62 years and 8 months, versus 63 years and 9 months if they only retain their DC plans. 
 
FIGURE 2: Predicted labor force participation of 
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We are also interested in understanding the impact on aggregate retirement patterns of the 
recent shift in pension structure.  However, there is no consistent data source that reports past 
changes in pension structure, and of course we must make inferences about future changes.  We 
will therefore rely on information from a few data sets.  For older workers (i.e., full-time 
employees) in the 1980s, we use employer-reported data on pensions from the Survey of  
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Consumer Finances (SCF) Pension Provider Supplement in 1983, and for younger workers in the 
1990s, we use individual-reported data from the 1995 SCF.
46  That allows us to establish trends 
in pension coverage starting with workers who were aged 53-57 in 1983 and finishing with 
workers who were aged 33-37 in 1995 and will be 53-57 in 2015.
47  To determine pension 
coverage of workers aged 53-57 at an intermediate date, we try both employer-reported data 
from the 1992 HRS and individual-reported data from the 1995 SCF.  Using the former yields a 
small past decline in DB pension coverage and a large future decline, while using the latter 
yields a larger past decline and smaller future decline.   
  The resulting predictions are shown in Table 7.
48  We assume no further change in DB 
coverage as workers aged 33-37 in 1995 get older, nor any change in typical DB pension 
provisions.
49  Our data sources imply a 41.3 percentage point decline in DB pension coverage 
among all workers aged 53-57 between 1983 and 2015, from 64.0% to 22.7%, and a 44.9 
percentage point decline among pensioned workers.  This implies a 10 month increase in the 
median retirement age of pensioned workers aged 53-57 over this period; or, equivalently, an 
increase in the predicted employment rate of pensioned workers from 59% to 65% at age 62 and 
from 31% to 45% at age 65.  Based on data from the 1992 HRS, that 10 month increase consists 
of a gain of 1 month between 1983 and 1992 and 9 months between 1992 and 2015.  Based 
instead on data from the 1995 SCF, it consists of a gain of 7 months between 1983 and 1995 and 
3 months between 1995 and 2015.  These forecasts follow directly from the simulation results 
                                                 
46  The SCF has surveyed a cross-section of households every three years since 1983.  In 1983 the SCF also 
collected pension data from the employers of respondents.  While employer-reported data is more accurate, as 
Gustman and Steinmeier (1999) noted, there is no source for younger workers in the 1990s.  We use the 1995 
instead of 1998 data because it is closer in time to the HRS data in 1992. 
47  We chose those age groups in order to observe long-term trends in pension structure because those aged 53-57 
are representative of older workers but have not yet begun retiring in large numbers, and those aged 33-37 are 
representative of younger workers but have already settled into relatively long-term jobs. 
48  Again, these are predicted participation rates for people are in full-time jobs at ages 51-61.   
49  Detailed evidence in Mitchell (1999) shows only minor changes during the 1990s.  
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discussed above.  Since having a DB plan reduces the median retirement age by about 21 
months, then, if DB coverage fell by 20 percentage points, that suggests an increase in the 
median retirement age of about 4 ½ months.   
In order to make projections for all workers in full-time jobs at ages 51-61, we have to 
take into account that, as DB pension coverage drops, some workers gain DC pensions and 
others have no pension.
50  We have to make some assumption about retirement behavior among 
those with no pension, even though our estimates do not offer any guidance about them.  We 
report predictions under two possible assumptions.  One is that the increased numbers without a 
pension will behave like workers with no pension in the 1992 HRS who are retiring later, on 
average, than workers with DB or DC plans; this assumption yields a jump of 13 months in the 
median retirement age of all workers aged 53-57 between 1983 and 2015, consisting of 3 (7) 
months early on and 10 (6) months later, based on the 1992 HRS (1995 SCF) data.  The overall 
increase in the median retirement age of 13 months corresponds to a gain in the predicted 
employment rate from 61% to 67% at age 62 and from 37% to 50% at age 65.  Another 
assumption is that they will behave like workers with DC plans, or alternatively that they will get 
a DC plan as they age; this assumption yields a jump in the median retirement age of all workers 
aged 53-57 of roughly 9 months, consisting of a little under 2 (6) months early on and a little 
under 8 (4) months later.  The increase in the median retirement age of 9 months corresponds to 
a gain in predicted employment from 64% to 71% at age 62 and from 38% to 52% at age 65.   
It is important to keep in mind that we cannot directly test how our simulated retirement 
rates match data reported in other sources, which do not distinguish the sample that was in full-
                                                 
50  Overall pension coverage in 1995 was lower for workers aged 33-37 than for workers aged 53-57.  This probably 
reflects both an age effect that disappears as the cohort grows older and a time effect due to trends in pension 
coverage.  We infer this because there was also an age differential in pension coverage in 1983, though it was 
smaller, and because pension coverage of older workers also fell between 1983 and 1995, though by less.    
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time jobs at ages 51-61.  Nevertheless, we can observe general trends in employment rates, 
which are shown in Figure 3 for older men in the Current Population Survey.
51  We would expect 
to see increases in employment rates at ages when DB plans typically induced retirement; at ages 
62-63, average accruals in DB plans in our HRS sample turned negative, according to Table 2.  
This is what Figure 3 shows, with the employment rate at ages 62-64 rising from 44.7% in the 
late 1980s and 43.2% in the early 1990s to 46.2% in the late 1990s and 48.1% in the early 2000s.  
Increases of a similar magnitude occurred for men aged 65-66.  In order to control crudely for 
aggregate trends, we might contrast those increases with slight declines in employment observed 
for men in their late 50s. 
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51  We focus on men because of major secular increases in labor supply of older women since the 1980s.  
Employment rates are computed using the basic monthly weights from March CPSs.  Using multiplicative 
adjustment factors that account for changes in the employment series due to the 1994 redesign yields almost the 
same results (Povlika and Miller 1998).  
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In sum, major changes in pension structure can be expected to raise the median 
retirement age of pensioned workers by 10 months, and the median retirement age of all workers 
by 9-13 months, when comparing the cohort aged 53-57 in 1983 with the cohort aged 53-57 in 
2015.  This response stands in sharp contrast to the trend towards earlier retirement that ceased in 
the early 1980s, and it can help explain increases in employment rates among people in their 60s 
since then. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
While an extensive literature has analyzed the savings effects of DC pensions, we focus 
on retirement.  We have found substantial changes in retirement patterns resulting from the 
spread of 401(k) and other DC plans in place of DB plans.  These changes arise because of major 
differences in the accrual of pension wealth – pension wealth in DC plans accrues smoothly, 
while pension wealth in traditional DB plans spikes sharply at older ages and turns negative 
afterwards.  While we expected to find smoother retirement rates for workers with DC plans 
compared to workers with DB plans, this does not allow us to predict a priori whether that would 
reduce the average retirement age, if DB plans constrain workers to retire later than they would 
otherwise; or raise the average retirement age, if DB plans constrain workers to retire earlier.   
Our estimates show that workers with DC plans are retiring significantly later.  
Retirement patterns begin to diverge at around age 55 and accelerate around age 60, when most 
workers with DB plans begin to experience negative accruals.  While endogenous selection into 
jobs with different pensions remains a concern, we find that older workers with different types of 
pensions are quite similar in their observable characteristics, and controlling for variables that 
may relate to selection does not alter the estimation results.    
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Thus, we conclude that the spread of DC pensions helps explain why employment rates 
have recently risen among people in their 60s, after decades of decline.  Our results suggest that 
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TABLE 1 
Characteristics of workers, 1992 





















N  948 304 276  1528 47 1527  3102  1332 
mean  birthyear  1937 1936 1937 1937 1936 1937 1937 1936 
female    0.45  0.42  0.37  0.43  0.47  0.42  0.43  0.50 
married    0.76  0.77  0.76  0.76  0.82  0.73  0.75  0.67 
poor health    0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.01  0.07  0.07  0.10 
education          
  < high school   0.11  0.15  0.07  0.11  0.09  0.16  0.13  0.28 
  completed HS   0.37  0.36  0.36  0.37  0.42  0.39  0.38  0.42 
  some college    0.52  0.49  0.57  0.52  0.49  0.45  0.49  0.30 
occupation         
  unskilled    0.37  0.31  0.32  0.33  0.30  0.39  0.36  0.54 
  semi-skilled    0.23  0.25  0.26  0.25  0.30  0.25  0.25  0.26 
  skilled    0.40  0.44  0.42  0.43  0.40  0.36  0.39  0.21 
industry          
  agric,mining,  
  construction 
  0.04 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.10 
  manuf, trsprt   0.32  0.29  0.44  0.33  0.19  0.38  0.35  0.24 
  prof services,  
  public admin 
  0.55 0.33 0.29 0.46 0.54 0.32 0.39 0.23 
  trade, non- 
  prof services 
  0.09 0.31 0.24 0.17 0.19 0.24 0.20 0.43 
mean job tenure   19  14  18  18  10  16  17  8 
median  
  earnings 
32,000 30,000 33,000 31,500 28,000 29,000 30,000 15,500
owns home    0.90  0.87  0.89  0.89  0.80  0.86  0.87  0.73 
median finan-   

















pension wealth at age 65             
25% quartile    89,920    49,109  160,354  - -  -  -  - 
median  203,949 102,298  345,156  - -  -  -  - 
75% quartile  384,378 230,946  647,207  - -  -  -  - 
Data:  Health and Retirement Study, wave 1, 1992. 
Sample:  People who in 1992 were aged 51-61, worked at least 30 hours per week, were not self-employed, 
were in households containing a financial respondent; and who were observed in wave 2 and did not leave 
their jobs involuntarily by wave 2.   
Notes:  The estimates use person-level analysis weights.  Those in column (4) told the HRS they had a 
pension but had zero DC assets and no DB pension.  Those in column (5) said they had a pension, but the 
HRS was unable to obtain data on their pension or Social Security.  Those in column (6) said they had no 
pension.  Skilled occupations include management, professional, and technical jobs; semi-skilled include 




Median of pension wealth accruals, as the retirement age changes 
    DB only              DC only  Combination 
 
Retirement  
   age: 







  Men          
  53    6,381  4,811    3,114   12,276   6,079  4,353 
  54    8,734  4,763    3,164   20,955     14,387  4,707 
  55    5,416  5,110    3,052   13,321   7,101  4,870 
  56    5,275  5,542    3,474   13,882   7,137  5,069 
  57    4,748  5,522    3,580   14,031   6,083  5,175 
  58    4,764  5,017    3,696   13,652   6,362  5,317 
  59    4,595  5,755    3,848   12,690   6,407  5,471 
  60    2,849  5,856    3,981   10,280   3,578  5,612 
  61    2,614  5,972    4,086    8,683   3,020  5,745 
  62      137  5,901    4,109    7,258   1,127  5,865 
  63     -798  5,973    3,982    6,622    -104  5,747 
  64  -1,527  5,932    4,040   5,988  -1,273  5,572 
  65  -3,267  5,612    3,745   2,483  -3,237  5,174 
  66  -4,086  5,263    3,627   1,111  -4,372  4,909 
    W o m e n        
  53     5,155  1,903  1,443    8,834  4,920  2,114 
  54     5,714  2,007  1,522    8,314  5,814  2,285 
  55     5,449  2,115  1,763    7,409  4,045  2,408 
  56     5,716  2,192  1,922    8,537  4,092  2,933 
  57     6,147  2,392  1,940    8,277  4,755  2,636 
  58     6,540  2,843  1,980    9,274  4,791  2,743 
  59     5,956  2,946  2,136    9,923  5,556  2,760 
  60     3,853  2,991  2,204    6,570  3,670  2,644 
  61     3,656   3,174  2,290    6,336  3,340  2,824 
  62     2,661  3,293  2,360    5,388  2,261  2,703 
  63     1,927  3,385  2,358    5,520  2,201  2,908 
  64     1,074  3,472  2,394    5,437  1,939  2,907 
  65        424  3,552  2,463    3,702     604  2,960 
  66      -186  3,532  2,486    3,179     216  2,865 
Data:  Health and Retirement Study. 
Sample:  Person-age observations of individuals from the sample appearing in columns (1)-(3) of Table 1, 
excluding observations below the age of 53 and excluding job exits that were involuntary or that were to 
another job, rather than to full retirement; this yields the same sample as that used in the estimation results 
in Table 5.   
Notes:  Pension wealth is defined as the value of the pension if workers leave their jobs at each particular 
age.  Pension wealth accrual is the discounted change in pension wealth gained by working one more 




More statistics on pension wealth accrual 
Quartile DB  DC  Combination 
values    25%  75%    25%    75%    25%    75%   
Retirement age:     
  Men    
53 2,083  14,454 3,017 10,413 6,592  20,767
54 1,724  21,191 2,777 9,829 9,577  60,340
55 2,094  12,173 3,224 10,260 7,387  20,811
56 1,913  10,953 3,440 10,676 6,597  22,800
57 1,349  10,342 2,988 10,411 7,614  24,154
58 789  9,868 2,790 11,138 7,123  23,062
59 239  10,236 2,892 10,703 6,403  27,330
60 -622  6,690 2,884 10,914 5,341  18,608
61 -1,686  6,911 3,075 11,256 3,576  17,973
62 -2,783  3,909 3,159 10,591 3,012  15,455
63 -4,716  2,915 2,971 10,727 1,654  13,950
64 -6,521  2,660 3,188 10,661 449  12,905
65 -9,008 369 3,000 9,625 -1,721  7,288
66 -10,959  -39 2,875 9,343 -3,050  5,624
  Women    
53 1,917  11,056 1,265 3,547 4,521  16,820
54  1,417  14,174 1,244 4,049    6,415  17,629
55 1,998  9,670 1,324 4,195 4,090  13,454
56 2,060  10,253 1,371 4,941 4,553  15,124
57 2,333  10,886 1,487 5,340 4,528  16,767
58 2,454  11,225 1,673 5,525 4,616  14,672
59 2,349  12,285 1602 6,431 4,832  15,503
60 1,486  7,269 1,718 5,995 3,580  12,525
61 1,298  7,426 1,886 6,226 3,673  12,206
62 821  5,149 1,909 6,341 3,431  9,299
63 129  4,209 1,859 6,670 3,265  8,798
64 -204  4,235 1,921 6,644 2,883  8,759
65 -1,571  1,708 1,958 6,967 1,738  6,702
66 -2,779  1,187 1,919 6,698 959  5,488

















DB  and 
DC 











53      2%      0%      0%      1%      0%      2%      1%     2% 
54   1   0   2   1   0   1   1   0 
55   3   1   6   3   0   3   3   2 
56   4   1   6   4   0   4   4   1 
57   5   1   3   4   0   2   3   2 
58   3   6   7   5   0   3   4   0 
59   6   2   9   6   5   5   5   4 
60   5   3   6   5   0   7   6   3 
61  11   7   9  10  17   5   7   2 
62  27 15 11 22   0 18 20 14 
63  23 31 22 25   0 16 21   9 
64  19   0  10  13   0   8  10   7 
65  24 19 48 26   0 19 22 15 
66  18   0   0  12   0   0   6   4 
  Total  37  25  33  34   8  25  30  16 
  Women          
53      3%      0%      0%      2%      0%      1%      1%      0% 
54   2   1   1   2   0   0   1   0 
55   6   0   5   5   0   1   3   0 
56   5   2   5   4   0   1   3   1 
57   3   1   4   3   5   1   2   1 
58   3   3   5   3   5   2   3   0 
59   7   3   2   5   0   3   4   1 
60   7   2   6   6  12   6   6   2 
61   9   5   7   8   0   6   7   4 
62  15 12 18 15 36 14 15   8 
63  20  10   9  16   7  14  15  12 
64  13   8 27 14   0 22 17   2 
65  29 20 21 25 48 27 27   7 
66  21 28 32 24   0 38 29   5 
    Total  40 19 25 26 39 16 23   9 
Sample:  Same as Table 1.   
Details:  Retirement hazard rates are computed as the percentage who are working at one birthday and have 
left their pensioned job and retired fully by the next birthday.  The sample excludes quits by people who 






Coefficient estimates on pension variables  
Dependent variable: leaves one’s job 5.1 5.2  5.3 
Pension  variables:     

































(peak value / earnings)
2:  DB plan  -  -    0.0008
** 
(0.0004) 
    DB portion of combined plan  -  -    0.0041
* 
(0.0022) 


















pension wealth / earnings:   
























































Coefficient estimates on pension variables  
Dependent variable: leaves one’s job 5.1 5.2  5.3 
Other financial variables:       









Social Security peak value / earnings:       































































Log likelihood per observation  -0.198  -0.198  -0.197 
Sample:  Person-age observations of individuals from the sample appearing in columns (1)-(3) of Table 1, 
through 1998 or until they retire, who are aged 53 and over, and who did not exit their job involuntarily or 
exit to another job.  N = 7965.   
Details:  The table reports estimated marginal effects from probits, computed at sample means of the right-
hand side variables, and, in parentheses, Huber-White standard errors adjusted for person-level clustering.  
The dependent variable is an indicator for leaving one’s job and retiring from one age to the next between 
1992  and 1998.  The estimates use person-level analysis weights.  Significance at the 90% (
*) and 95% (
**) 






Coefficient estimates on other variables  
Dependent variable: leaves one’s job   5.3 
Other independent variables:     
industry: agriculture, mining, construction    -0.0095   (0.0091) 
   manufacturing, transport    -0.0037   (0.0057) 
   professional services, public admin    -0.0057   (0.0081) 
firm size: 100-500 employees    0.0077   (0.0101) 
   >500 employees    0.0044   (0.0054) 
tenure: joined employer 1974-85    -0.0024   (0.0051) 
   joined employer 1986+    -0.0063   (0.0067) 
occupation: admin, professional, technical    0.0006   (0.0070) 
   sales, clerical    0.0048   (0.0074) 
union member    0.0043   (0.0051) 
has pay and promotion responsibility    0.0102   (0.0067) 
health insurance:  provided by employer    -0.0091   (0.0078) 
   employer plan provided to retirees     0.0101
*  (0.0053) 
   privately purchased       0.0042   (0.0067) 
   from Medicare or VA     0.0733
** (0.0486) 
   from Medicaid or other public source     0.0232
** (0.0115) 
hospitalized: once in last year    -0.0028   (0.0067) 
   twice or more in last year    0.0036  (0.0126) 
education: high-school diploma at least    -0.0037   (0.0079) 
   more than 12 years schooling    -0.0167
** (0.0058) 
demographic characteristics:  female    0.0017   (0.0111) 
   married    -0.0093   (0.0098) 
   married female    0.0121   (0.0131) 
   black    -0.0021   (0.0064) 
   hispanic    -0.0009   (0.0103) 
age:      54  -0.0062   (0.0152)                 61  0.0775
** (0.0323) 
            55  0.0382
** (0.0233)                 62  0.1800
** (0.0503) 
            56  0.0392
** (0.0234)                 63  0.2193
** (0.0610) 
            57  0.0218   (0.0201)                 64  0.1245
** (0.0536) 
            58  0.0334
*  (0.0230)                 65  0.2572
** (0.0795) 
            59  0.0455
** (0.0253)                 66  0.1770
** (0.0834) 
            60  0.0325




Regression results, additional specifications: 
Coefficient estimates on pension variables  











a new job 







   combined plan, only voluntary  




















   DB portion of combined plan,  












(peak value / earnings)







   DB portion of combined plan,  
   only voluntary contrib. in DC plan  




    DB portion of combined plan    0.0059
** 
(0.0021) 
  -0.0004 
  (0.0090) 
-0.0059 
(0.0047) 







   combined plan, only voluntary  
   contributions in DC plan  
- 0.0142   
(0.0283) 
- 














   combined plan, only voluntary  










(collinear w/ other 
variables) 
pension wealth / earnings:   











   DB (combined plan), only  

























































Regression results, additional specifications: 
Coefficient estimates on pension variables  
Dependent variable: leaves one’s job 6.1 6.2  6.3 
 
 








a new job 









Social Security peak difference / earnings:     



























at or older than peak value:  









































Log likelihood per observation  -0.172  -0.201  -0.113 
Number of observations  7962  7635  7254 
See Table 5 notes.   
Details:  In 6.1, the discount rate used to compute DB pension wealth was set at 5% instead of 3%.  In 6.2, DC 
pension wealth excludes an estimate of voluntary contributions, as described in the text; consequently, we 
chose to distinguish in the estimation between combined plans with a DC component that only has voluntary 
contributions and other combined plans.  In 6.3, the sample excludes exits to full retirement and includes exits 




Predicted changes in retirement  
  Change in retirement attributable to past change in pension structure 
  Workers aged:  Workers aged: 
  53-57 in 1983  53-57 in 1992  53-57 in 1983  53-57 in 1995 
data  source  SCF HRS SCF SCF 
respondents employers  employers  employers  workers 
actual pension structure       
   % DB, combined  64.0  55.4  64.0  38.5 
   % DC only  12.0  13.6  12.0  32.4 
   % no pension  24.0  31.1  24.0  29.2 
predicted change in median retirement age: 
   over the time period:                1983-1992  1983-1995 
   among workers with a pension:  +1 months  +7 months 
   among all workers, if those with no pension behave like: 
     those with no pension today     +3 months  +7 months 
     those with a DC plan today      +2 months  +6 months 
  Change in retirement attributable to future change in pension structure 
  Workers aged:  Workers aged: 
  53-57 in 1992  33-37 in 1995  53-57 in 1995  33-37 in 1995 
data source  HRS  SCF  SCF  SCF 
respondents employers  workers  workers  workers 
actual pension structure       
   % DB, combined  55.4  22.7  38.5  22.7 
   % DC only  13.6  35.0  32.4  35.0 
   % no pension  31.1  42.3  29.2  42.3 
predicted change in median retirement age: 
   over the time period      1992-2015  1995-2015 
   among workers with a pension:   +9 months  +3 months 
   among all workers, if those with no pension behave like: 
     those with no pension today     +10 months  +6 months 
     those with a DC plan today        +8 months  +4 months 
Predictions based on simulation results from specification 5.3 and on the observed decline in DB pension 
coverage.  See text for more details. 
 